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The Naval Reserve has recently been restructured to meet
the criteria of the Total Force Policy. Part of that re-
structuring established a Reserve Telecommunication Program
which supports Commander, Naval Telecommunication Command,
in his mobilization requirements. Unless the program is more
carefully monitored and funded, the Reserve Telecommunication
Program will not be able to provide the properly trained per-
sonnel to the communication community as required. In this
respect various training alternatives have been investigated
and compared on the basis of their relative cost to the
effectiveness of their training value. From this qualitative
assessment of the alternatives, a format of training may be
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I. NAVAL RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE
A form of the Naval Reserve as we know it today had its
origins in the Sixty-Fourth Congress of the United States.
It was in that Congress in the Year 1916 that a Naval Reserve
Force Act was passed; the implied intent seemed to be one of
creating a viable force which would complement the Navy in
time of need. It read in part:
There is hereby established, under the Department
of the Navy, a Naval Reserve Force, to consist of
six classes, designated as follows; and as here-
inafter described:
First, the Naval Fleet Reserve
Second, the Naval Reserve
Third, the Naval Coast Defense Reserve
Fourth, the Naval Auxiliary Reserve
Fifth, the Volunteer Naval Reserve
Sixth, the Naval Reserve Flying Corps
Members of the Naval Reserve Force may be ordered
into active service in the Navy by the President
in time of war or when in his opinion a national
emergency exists. [1]
Within this charter lay the seeds of problems which
would mature with the newborn service and continue to plague
it throughout its existence. The first problem, and possibly
the more serious, was the very complicated organizational
structure it had established; the second was its direct re-
lationship to the Department of the Navy and not the Navy it-
self. As a result of lessons learned during service in World
War I, the Reserve and Congress acted, in 1925, to reorganize
the Naval Reserve and eliminated some of the inherent prob-
lems [2]. The introduction of the Naval Reserve Act reads:

That the Naval Reserve Force established under
the Act of August 29, 1916, is hereby abolished,
and in lieu thereof there is hereby created and
established, as a component of the United States
Navy, a Naval Reserve which shall consist of
three classes, namely: The Fleet Naval Reserve,
Volunteer Naval Reserve, and the Merchant Marine
Naval Reserve [3]
.
Thus, the Congress acted to both streamline the organiza-
tional structure of the Naval Reserve Force and emphasize its
intent that the Naval Reserve was to be a component part of
the United States Navy. A review of Congressional actions
from that time to the present would seem to indicate that
this message did not meet with the acceptance that was in-
tended. The concept of the Reserve as a component of the
"Total Force" had to be backed by law in 1938 [4] . And again
in 1952, it was written into law that "The bureaus and offices
of the Navy were to hold the same relation and responsibility
to the Naval Reserve as they did to the regular establish-
ment. There shall be no discrimination between and among
members of the regular and reserve components." [5]
The problem which has been nurtured with the very charac-
ter of the Reserve Force seemed to have no solution. This
may be due in no small part to its own mismanagement and the
lack of command attention by those to whom Congress had en-
trusted its development.
In 1946, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, believ-
ing the Naval Reserve to be a vital part of the Navy, tried to
establish the principle of integrated management. The Reserve
was to be supported by and to function with the Active Navy
as a single entity. The Naval Reserve was not to be a
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separate force commanded and administered unto itself, but a
force to be directly involved with the active operating forces
under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations. His
attempt to institute this concept had questionable success.
As recently as 1972, a Naval Reserve management study spon-
sored by OPNAV cited the following problems as contributing
to "a Naval Reserve lacking direction, visibility and resources
to be a viable and dynamic component of the Total Force": [6]
1. The responsibility for general overall Reserve Pro-
gram coordination was not defined.
2. There was no established policy concerning where
Reserve Program sponsorship should be placed.
3. Reserve representation in the conduct of the Naval
Reserve business was not provided; in many cases, the unique
nature of Reserve management and program support was not
understood.
Thus, the Naval Reserve became its own worst enemy.
Even with more support from the Navy, the Reserve could not
function at an efficient level for long; but until recently,
support from the Navy did not come. Support was not offered
for many of the reasons discussed previously, management,
mistrust, ignorance; but the primary reason for this lack of
acceptance of the Reserve Force as a component of the Total
Force is best stated as follows:
A sharpening of competition between Regular and
Reserve was reflected by a key Pentagon official
in testimony presented to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, in which he identified as one
of the major constraints to the development of a
11

visible and credible Reserve Force 'ingrained
attitudes - the 'we versus they' approach - the
delineation of responsibility for Guard/Reserve
problems ' - the view that any move to upgrade
Reserves would downgrade Active Forces. [7]
It appeared that the time had come again to reevaluate the
role of the Naval Reserve within the Total Force structure
To redefine its mission, restructure the organization and
instill new purpose within its personnel.
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II. RESTRUCTURING THE NAVAL RESERVE
This nation's concept of a Total Force which has been
with the Reserve programs, Army, Navy, and Air Force, since
they began has become by necessity a national policy, policy
which is dictated by the termination of the draft, attitudes
of the population and sheer monetary constraints. The impetus
for this implementation of policy came shortly after President
Johnson's decision in 1965 to use draftees for expansion of
the war in Vietnam vice mobilization of the Reserve Forces to
augment the active duty effort [8]. The Administration and
Congress came under increasing pressure to base the nation's
primary defensive readiness on a Total Force of active and
Reserves. Because of the difficulties encountered in the
past in implementing such a concept, a thorough examination
of the organizational structure of the Reserve Program was
undertaken. The mission of the Naval Reserve is:
To provide trained, ready and available reserve
units for employment in the Active Forces as may
be directed by CNO in order to increase capabili-
ty of active forces upon outbreak of hostilities
and declaration of an emergency or otherwise
authorized by law. [9]
To accomplish this the Reserve has been organized in many
different forms over its years of existence. Up until very
recently the Reserve consisted of two separate forces - the
Surface Reserve and the Air Reserve, each having its own
commander. Neither of the two commanders reported directly
13

to CNO but to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower
and the Naval Reserve) . Neither was a major claimant in the
budget process. Because of the problems encountered in the
past the two Reserve Forces were reorganized into one under a
Chief of Naval Reserve reporting directly to CNO. Under this
arrangement the Reserve Forces became, for the first time in
its history, a major claimant capable of major budget lever-
age. (See Figures 1 and 2.)
Within what has been formerly the Surface Reserve, a com-
mon thread can be found which remained with it during the
many reorganizations occurring in its lifetime and that was
the firm insistence on mobilizing the individual rather than
a unit. This was contrary to the way it generally was done
in other services and, in fact, contrary to the spirit of the
Reserve mission to "provide trained, ready and available
units ..." [10] The argument usually put forth in justifying
its insistence on individual mobilization vice unit mobiliza-
tion centered on the premise that due to the large mix of
different rates required to supplement a given active duty
unit, there was no assurance that these required rates could
be located in a given geographical area to train and mobilize
as a single unit. This fact, notwithstanding the pressure
to reorganize and streamline the structure of the Naval Re-
serve, became paramount and, in 197 3, the Naval Reserve was
restructured to conform to its mission under the Total Force
policy [11]
.




























Figure 2. RESTRUCTURED NAVAL RESERVE
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1. Develop a basic policy to define the role of the re-
serve component in the Navy Total Force.
2. Refine the structure and rationalize the size of the
reserve component in accordance with this policy.
3. Correlate and update all of the Navy's mobilization
plans to optimize the Total Force contribution in execution
of national strategy.
On 25 October 1974, the Chief of Naval Operations promul-
gated new, somewhat surprising but realistic policy [11]. It
stated, in essence, that the size of the Total Force and the
Reserves
' contribution thereto is determined purely on the
number of minimally capable ships and aircraft in service or
reserve at the time plus sufficient base support organizations
to support them. Thus, the restructuring aimed to organize
small, easily mobilized units at Reserve Centers around the
country which were designated to support specific active duty
assets. The initial step to accomplish this was relatively
easy and that was to identify and assign those selective
Reserve units which would support Reserve units with organic
equipment and those which would, as a unit, complement active
ships and aircraft. The final step was more difficult and is
an ongoing one. This was to identify the augmentation re-
quirements for the shore establishment.
This is a formidable task, since the size of the
shore establishment has an imprecise relation to:
the size of the force being supported, the locale
and duration of a conflict, the time phasing of
the buildup to support the engaged forces, the
realistic absorption rate of existing and reacti-
vated facilities, and many other factors. [12]
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The restructuring was implemented in June 1974. It was
shortly thereafter that planners commenced work on how to
accomplish it. Briefly, the mobilization requirements were
grouped by operational command and from there to specific
units. The unit requirements and their attendant billets were
then assigned to Naval Reserve Centers around the country on
the basis of a demographic survey. Individual reservists
would be picked from local assets to fill the various billets
within the units assigned to a particular Reserve Center. The
training of that unit would then be geared to increasing the
readiness of the individuals to perform as an integral part
of that type command to which the unit was assigned to be
mobilized. The Reserve structure was ultimately broken into
ten major programs and one additional program which contains
20 sub-programs. (See Figure 3.)
One sub-program of Program 11 is the telecommunication
program which was established to directly augment Commander,

















































With the background on the nature and extent of the
Naval Reserves' part in the Total Force concept, there is
immediately two areas of concern to consider in the newly re-
structured force. The first concerns whether, in fact, the
mobilization requirements as stated by the various operational
commanders are valid. Many of the stated requirements could
be based on criteria that have long since changed through the
introduction of new technology or a change in a command's
mission; these requirements may be over or understated.
Furthermore, and more importantly, they may be incorrect inso-
far as adequately describing the quality of the requirement.
By this, it is meant that the requirement may take a more or
possibly less highly trained individual to accomplish the
stated task. Assuming these requirements can be identified
and corrected as necessary, a more serious problem remains:
Can the Reserve supply these individuals in the proper number
and quality by rate and rating as the requirement is stated?
If the call for even a partial mobilization were made, could
the Naval Reserve fulfill its mission to "provide trained
units . . . for active duty in the Armed Forces in time of war
or national emergency ..." [10]
The second area of concern is one of training and the
state of readiness of the individual reservist to accomplish
his assigned tasks. As noted before, the Reserve Program
emphasized the individual rather than the unit. The individual
20

reservist was encouraged to better himself and his position
in the Naval Reserve through promotion to higher levels. His
professional development was limited to study from correspond-
ence courses and other aids as they were available. For most
rates / on-the-job training and exposure to new systems, tech-
nology and procedures was limited to the two weeks spent on
Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) . Even then, the tendency
was to employ the individual at his present level of competen-
cy rather than taking the time to introduce him to new innova-
tions. All too often his level of professional competency is
that which he had when he was separated from active duty even
though he may have reached a higher promotional status in the
Reserve; this can be very frustrating for a sincerely moti-
vated individual.
Since ACDUTRA is supposed to be a key factor in
maintaining mobilization readiness and an influ-
ential component of the individual reservist's
training program, it is disturbing to see it
perceived by so many with indifference or dis-
satisfaction. This suggests that ACDUTRA, as
presently established and conducted, may be
counterproductive for many reservists. [13]
The situation then arises, of what use is this individual in
the event of mobilization? During the confused and hectic
days after a recall, little time would be spared to familiar-
ize and train Reserve personnel [9]. These are questions
which need to be answered for the broad spectrum of the Naval
Reserve. For purposes of this discussion, the question will




Each of the reserve program's personnel allowance is
predicated on the mobilization requirements of the active
force, on a near one-to-one basis. Therefore, each active
component has a vested interest in maintaining its reserve
counterpart to augment it during mobilization, in respect to
both numbers and mission readiness. The individual reserve
programs can provide this only through maintenance of a viable
training program. In all too many cases, this is not possi-
ble; there is no viable means to engage an individual in
meaningful training and, as a consequence, his motivation to
remain in the program is reduced. Thus, the individuals re-
quired by the active commands for mobilization may not be
available.
This should be a very real and large concern of the
operational commander, for it is with these reservists that
he will have to accomplish his expanded mission in time of
crisis or national emergency. With this consideration the
operational commands must give serious thought to monitoring
the readiness of the individuals and units that will serve
under them: It should be a part of command responsibility to
advise on and possibly even direct the reserve training
program that relates to their individual missions.
This is the situation as it exists within the Tele-
communication Program. As the program now stands, the requi-
site number of individuals are available* but the amount and
*As of November 1975, average manning of units was at
85% of authorized strength.
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quality of training is being hampered by lack of equipment
and funds. The training can be provided; the cost of this
training will be a function of how soon an individual is to
perform as an efficient member of an active duty command.
Thus, the program sponsor must have a direct input into the
readiness requirements and the inspection of the attainment
of those requirements since it directly relates to the opera-




The mission of the Telecommunication Reserve Program
is to provide mission capable, task performing units
available for immediate mobilization in the event of
war, national emergency, or otherwise authorized by
law necessary to meet the most crucial needs at
telecommunications activities specified herein, or
as otherwise dictated by contingency. [14]
To accomplish this stated mission, the Telecommunications
Program was established as a sub-program of the Support and
General Program, Program 11. It was placed under the sponsor-
ship of the Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command, and
his representative, OP941CR. The program itself is in the
direct chain of command from Chief of Naval Reserve, Naval
District Commandants and Readiness commands. All administra-
tion and policy flows through the chain of command to the
individual units. Mission requirements and training criteria
are to be provided by NAVTELCOM.
The program has been placed in a status which authorizes
its assigned enlisted personnel 48 paid drill days and its
officers 24 paid drill days annually. Current regulations
require 90 per cent satisfactory attendance for retention in
the program. Additionally, the members of the program are
authorized 14 days of ACDUTRA annually to be performed as an
integral unit as feasible. When such training is not avail-
able, individual members are authorized to request training
duty in a communications-related billet as an individual.
The Telecommunications Program has an authorized strength
of 1,117 officers and enlisted personnel. The assigned
24

personnel are divided into 89 separate units which would
mobilize in direct support of 11 NAVTELCOM commands and 13
other commands requiring telecommunications personnel augmen-
tation during a full or partial mobilization.
The 8 9 units are subdivided into three functional groups
according to their mobilization mission. The first group com-
prises 10 units and is known as the Mandatory Quota Group.
This group which has an authorized strength of 20 officers
and 160 enlisted are designated the primary recall groups.
They would be the first and most important groups to be mobil-
ized in that their function is to augment the DCS responsibi-
lity at designated COMMSTA's.
The second functional group comprises some 14 units and
is known as the Base Support Group (Base Consolidated Tele-
communications Activities (BCT) ) . This group has an author-
ized strength of 28 officers and 308 enlisted. The primary
purpose for their existence is to mobilize and to augment
telecommunications activities at major Fleet Commands in the
event of a recall. Although not directly responsive to
NAVTELCOM, these personnel will be employed at those major
communications centers that interface with NAVTELCOM facili-
ties and are therefore a vital link in the chain.
The third and last group consists of some 65 units which
are known as the Operational Staff Group. The authorized
allowance for this portion of the program is 130 officers and
987 enlisted personnel. The major function of the Operational
Staff Group is to supplement the active manning of 13 NAV-
COMMSTA's at the time of mobilization. The allowance of the
25

program and the individual groups contained herein are con-
tained in Appendix A. The breakdown of the mobilization re-
quirements as required by each functional group is contained
in Appendix B. The individual commands that these 89 units
will support is contained in Appendix C.
The allowances contained in Appendix B are taken from
the requirements as stated by NAVTELCOM and the other supported
commands Mobilization Manpower Allocation Requirement Plans
(M-MARP)
. For the most part, these plans do not reflect the
current requirements of the command but are based on the M-day
plus requirements of the years past. As new equipment or new
procedures were placed in operation, the corresponding person-
nel requirements for mobilization were not fully addressed;
thus, when the mobilization requirements for this program were
called, due consideration had not been given to the current
situation [15] . Appendix D provides the billets upon which
the allowance of the program is predicated. These billets
show requirements for a large number of personnel to operate
facilities in both a manual, torn tape and automated mode.
In reviewing the actual requirements as submitted by a portion
of the supported commands , there appears to be a large incon-
sistency in the billets initially authorized as opposed to
those actually required [16]. The seriousness of this be-
comes apparent when it is realized that each individual as-
signed in a unit is in reality now assigned to a specific
command and a job or billet within that command. During his
time in the program he will theoretically be training toward
26

proficiency in that billet, hopefully on the equipment used
in that job. Thus, if the individual is recalled and the
skill he was trained for is different than the one for which
he was recalled, he is in effect a wasted asset for a time.
Thus, what is needed is an on-going program which will
establish individual billets within the Reserve units keyed
to the active duty commands 1 actual requirements. From a
pure numbers side of the program, it will work only if those
who are to be served will give the proper attention to what




Prior to restructuring, the Reserve Program was built
around an individual and his possible future use in the event
of mobilization. All too often his affiliation in the pro-
gram could be viewed as just a name to be kept on a list to
be used for mobilization. He was given the opportunity to
advance on the promotional ladder; it kept him happy; it kept
him in the program. But, he did not have the opportunity to
use or increase his skills to make him truly useful in the
event of a recall. For a Radioman or Electronics Technician,
how do you increase your skills if you have no radios, tele-
types, radar or pubs on your two weeks of ACDUTRA? All too
often, the situation was "I ain't going to let no damn reserve
work on my gear. He'll screw it up. He don't know nothing."
This response was probably very close to true and thus "he
ain't going to learn nothing, ever."
Like ACDUTRA, drill training is a keystone of
mobilization readiness and should be constructed
such that it would be profitable and enjoyable
for the reservist. Without facilities and support
to construct it as such, it is not. For many re-
servists^, drill is viewed with indifference; and
for too many reservists, it is viewed as the rea-
son for leaving the Reserve Program. [13]
In restructuring the Naval Reserve, this basic fault was
considered and attempts were made to correct this fundamental
shortfall. Under the Total Force concept, the reserve unit
became the fallback in the event of augmentation of the active
force. As such, it was planned that each unit knew to which
28

command it was going by name, and each individual knew what
his job was and what type of equipment he would be responsi-
ble to operate or repair. The unit itself was to become an
integral part of the active duty command so that the individu-
al and the unit could gear its training to that particular
command's mission. But, here again, how do you train an
individual without the facilities to train? For the most
part, Reserve Centers are ill-equipped. The equipment there
dates into the early 50* s; to anyone's way of thinking,
there have been a lot of technological changes since then.
Thus, there are no real facilities to train on. The situa-
tion will probably not improve in the short run; CNO has
stated:
In the case of capabilities assigned predominantly
to the Regular Force, new equipment is ordinarily
not procured specifically for the Reserve Force.
Instead, equipment typically migrates to the Re-
serve Force as a result of Regular Force moderniza-
tion. This policy stems from the higher readiness
demanded of the rotationally deployed Regular
Force, which requires that it have the most techno-
logically advanced capabilities. [11]
It is apparent, another way to increase training readiness
must be found.
COMNAVTELCOM as sponsor of the Telecommunications Pro-
gram has stated that the primary training emphasis for Re-
serve telecommunications units is to attain a level of opera-
tional and functional readiness attuned with NAVTELCOM stand-
ards. To accomplish this, it is important that units are
familiar with and train on current operational communications
assets [14] . The Communications Commander has envisioned that
the majority of the Reserve personnel would be fully qualified
29

to maintain and operate any second generation communication
facility. A second generation facility is one which uses low
speed I/O terminals and manual processing. However, each unit
should immediately work to become proficient in third genera-
tion facilities (High speed I/O terminals with automatic
digital processing during transit through final distribution)
.
For a unit to achieve these training standards can be diffi-
cult to say the least. The typical Reserve Center normally
has no more than one low power transmitt receiver and possibly
two teletypes. Usually, the only frequencies authorized are
those in MARS band; thus, opportunity to attain a level of
proficiency is severely limited.
This equipment shortfall has been realized, and COMNAV-
TELCOM has recommended that if a Naval Communication Activity
is within a unit's local area, units should be trained and
integrated into that activity's communication or electronics
maintenance weekend watch schedule. As a minimum this should
be done twice per year. For these purposes, NAVCOMMSTA SAN
FRANCISCO, NAVCOMMSTA SAN DIEGO, NAVCOMMSTA NORFOLK, and
NAVTELCOM NEWPORT have been made available. A review of the
geographical locations of the 89 units contained in Figure 4
indicates that only four units are located within reasonable
commuting distance* of a designated Naval communication
facility.
COMNAVTELCOM has indicated that on ACDUTRA each reservist
is expected to requalify in his assigned mobilization billet.
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However, here again, there are factors which will limit any
one unit or individual from accomplishing this. First, no
ACDUTRA can be performed out of the Continental United States
[17]. Thus, those units which have a mobilization to NAVCOMM-
STA's OUTUS are precluded from training at those sites.
Thus, here lies the problem; on one hand, we have an
operational commander, COMMNAVTELCOMM, stating a seemingly
valid mobilization requirement. On the other, we have the
reserve command attempting to meet that requirement, but the
question is: can the requirement be met with the properly
trained personnel in the present environment? To the credit
of the program personnel, efforts are being made to utilize
present personnel and equipment assets to provide some defini-
tive training, but it is a hit or miss situation and does not
address the question: total readiness for the entire program.
The answer appears to direct itself into two areas, the
long run and the short run, and the overall response to each
of these is overshadowed by another major influence, the
operational commander, COMNAVTELCOMM. The program does not
exist unto itself, for itself; it exists for the sole purpose
of meeting the operational needs of COMNAVTELCOMM in time of
crisis or national emergency. Thus, anything and everything
that is done within and to the program should be done in
response or with concurrence of COMNAVTELCOMM.
In a sense, this has been done; general training require-
ments and mission requirements have been laid on the reserve
program. The Reserve Program has in turn attempted to
32

implement this through directives and funding. What has not
been done is to define the mobilization requirements in terms
of when an individual unit is required to be completely mis-
sion capable* after mobilization. With this information,
training and basic program administration can be equated to
the funds, equipment and time that must be expended to attain
that level of mission readiness.
Thus, if COMNAVTELCOMM indicates that a particular unit
is so assigned and includes such personnel that their function
in mobilization billets are that they would not be required
to perform at full efficiency until "X" number of days after
arrival at the mobilization billet, then "Y" dollars need be
expended on their training and existence in the Reserve Pro-
gram. The function here is not linear, thus the more expended
on a unit does not correspondingly decrease its mission cap-
able time in direct proportion. What then is the amount that
need be expended on an individual unit? This must come from
the operational commander who has the mission requirements.
There are, of course, constraints on what should be expended
in attaining a level of mission readiness and that is roughly
a factor of five, or the amount dedicated to training any one
individual should be less than five times the amount he is
being paid. Above this, it would be more cost effective to
replace the reserve with a regular (See Figure 5)
.
Mission capable time refers to the time required after
reporting to a mobilization billet until a unit or individual











































In looking at both a solution for providing training in
the long and short run, any one answer that is offered must be
consistent with the time that the unit is required to be
fully mission capable within the command. COMNAVTELCOMM
should review his requirements and restate them in terms of
the degree of readiness the particular unit needs to mobilize.
With this in mind the answer to what type of training
and what facilities and funds are required can be addressed.
The problem as stated before lies in two directions - the long
run and the short run. The reason for this is that in the
long run considerable facilities and equipments required need
to be funded and the time for the budget cycle does not allow
consideration in the near future.
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VI. THE SHORT RUN ALTERNATIVES
Training in the short run then is strictly limited to
facilities on board or programmed and to funds identified in
the budget. The type and pattern of training is then based
on the cost of the training in relation to the degree of
readiness required. From the low end there is the training
that is conducted within the unit's own training center
coupled with two weeks of ACDUTRA. Here the training would
necessarily center on classroom instruction, correspondence
courses and preparation for inspections and ACDUTRA. The cost
for this training is minimal and the time until this unit
would be mission capable after mobilization would be maximum.
The other end would cost the most and provide the least time
until the unit was mission capable after mobilization. This
would involve one weekend away for training at a NAVCOMMSTA
once each quarter and two weeks of ACDUTRA. The difference
between the two approaches can be calculated in terms of
dollars; in terms of differences in times than the unit is
mission capable can only be estimated. Generally, an
individual takes about five weeks to become proficient in a
new job; under the concept of utilizing an individual once a
quarter, this time can be reduced. It can be reduced by the
fact that it is never more than two months since he last per-
formed the same functions while, on the other hand, the longest
a person could have been away from a similar function is
twelve months. In the former case, the learning curve is
36

reenforced at much smaller intervals than the latter [18] . It
is estimated that it could be nearly cut in half; but it would
cost more money. The question then is if the people are real-
ly necessary and if their mission capable time is of value,
where do the funds come from? If they are not available from
within the command, can they come from elsewhere? The opera-
tional commander certainly has an interest in the situation;
should he demand the additional funds be provided since he is
the requirer and he, not the reserve, reaps the benefit of
the mobilized individuals. The budget formulation process
for the program should be structured so that the full program
cost can be assessed in respect to the mission that must be
accomplished. In other words, the requirements must be deter-
mined before the amount of funds needed are budgeted and not
the reverse. Since COMNAVTELCOMM should determine the degree
of mission capable time required for the reservists that
support him, he too should have a direct say in what trade-
offs between equipment and personnel costs should be allocated
to the program. Certainly, even in a pure training status,
the individuals can be of material benefit to COMNAVTELCOMM'
s
operation. If scheduled and rotated properly between the
three NAVCOMMSTA's Norfolk, San Diego and San Francisco, the
telecommunication program could provide approximately four
officers and eighteen enlisted each weekend of the year.
Additionally, the ACDUTRA could be scheduled so that one re-
serve unit was at each of the three communications stations
continuously throughout the year. This would, in effect,
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provide an increase in a station's allowance of some 20 per-
sonnel. If, due to this contribution, the station's active
duty allowance could be reduced, the overall costs savings
would be on a five to one basis which could be posted against
the increased cost of implementing such a program.
Another course of action could be to change the drilling
status of the program from Category A to B. This would reduce
the overall drilling time from 4 8 to 24 paid drills per year.
This action would be undertaken with the understanding that
the overall costs savings realized would be applied to financ-
ing a more viable training program. The rationale behind
such a move is based on the fact that attempting to train in
a classroom without equipment or facilities is counterproduc-
tive [19]. Thus, why waste a weekend doing nothing, if the
savings realized from not scheduling that weekend could be
applied toward transportation and berthing some other weekend.
In a Category B status, 24 weekends would be available per
year. Of these, sixteen would be scheduled as a week away
training (WAT) at a NAVCOMMSTA; the remaining eight drills
would be scheduled as single drills in the month that WAT was
not scheduled. This would cover for inspections, administra-
tion and preparation for weekend away training (See Figure 6)
.
What has been done in effect is to limit drilling to meaning-
ful and productive times and sites at one-half the present
direct personnel costs.
Department of Defense has calculated the cost of a re-
servist in Category A at $3400 per year. They also figure





































Figure 6. Typical Drill Schedule
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difference of $1300 per reservist for training cost [20]
.
The average distance from any one telecommunications unit to
the nearest NAVCOMMSTA is approximately 730 miles. Figuring
the average airfare to be .10 per air mile or less, the cost
of four weekends away training sessions ($584) is well below
the initial net savings. The additional funds could be applied
to messing and berthing costs, if necessary, or to enhancement
of the facilities of the home training center.
Just as the operational commander has an interest in who
and how the reserve personnel in the telecommunications program
are being trained, he should have an interest in measuring the
state of their readiness. As it is now structured, this
function normally falls to the reserve command on the district
level. The present operational state of readiness is normally
determined as part of the annual administrative inspection of
a reserve unit. It would certainly seem more prudent and
more of a valid indicator of a unit's readiness if such an
evaluation could be made on-site where meaningful training
is conducted and operational equipment is available. COMNAV-
TELCOMM should assume the responsibility for evaluating opera-
tional readiness of individual units; he should be the one who
requires the program or an individual unit to emphasize or de-
emphasize certain types of training as a result of what he has
learned through observation of the units in inspection. He
is the reason that the units exist; thus, he should have a
say in what is happening.
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VII. THE LONG RUN ALTERNATIVES
In the long run, the area in which planning for a perma-
nent solution and a corresponding permanent equipment suite
might be required should be dealt with now. COMNAVTELCOMM
has stated that all units should work toward proficiency in
third generation communication switching and message process-
ing systems. These systems include NAVCOMPARS , LDMX, satel-
lite systems and others yet to be activated. Planners must
analyze these systems and their operation with the idea that
a portion of their being will or will not be dependent on the
existence of Naval Reserve personnel to man them. If it is
seen that Naval Reserve personnel are required, then this
factor must be taken into account in figuring the implementa-
tion and operational cost of the system. It should not be
set aside as an inconsequential item.
In this regard, the things to be included in any such
life cycle cost analysis will become a function of the com-
mander's requirements as to when reserve personnel or units
are to be considered mission capable on any particular system.
Thus, if personnel are to be phased in over a period of time
and trained on station on a particular system, then the cost
to the system and the expenditure on training reserves is
minimal. Conversely, if the reserve personnel are to be con-
sidered to be replacements for active duty personnel trans-
ferred to duty with front line combatants, then the cost to
the system and the expenditure by the reserve program would




Therefore, the planning for any long range training pro-
gram for the reserve telecommunication program must initially
be based on these two criteria:
1) What is it that the reserve personnel are
training for. What elements of what system
are earmarked for operation by the reserves.
2) What response time is required of individual
units once mobilization has been ordered.
Once these have been established, the associated allowable
costs and amount of training required can be determined to
form cost parameters. Then, the format of a training program
can be established. The format of programs should address
the total life cycle costs associated with it. That is on a
continuing basis over a certain number of years, costs,
limited by the criteria previously established, would include
research and development cost, initial investment and continu-
ing maintenance and operation cost [22] . This life cycle cost
should be developed for any alternative program considered.
The final selection of a format for training would be the
least costly still remaining within the established para-
meters .
To develop some training format within this discussion
would not be possible, for as discussed before, the criteria
upon which it would be based is not known. It must be deve-
loped by the operational commander to whom the program must
be responsive. All that can be done here is to look at
alternatives and highlight what the relative cost of one to
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the other would be in relation to what degree of mission re-
sponsiveness might be expected.
Weekend away training provides the best operational
training, since it is conducted in a real-world operational
situation. Performance on any single task or even a multitude
of related tasks could be expected to improve markedly as the
skills and job knowledge were reenforced over the year. This
is based on a four drill weekend once per quarter and two
weeks of ACDUTRA per year. The question of additional drills,
other than the eight remaining under a Category B status,
would be one of determining if any additional drills would
provide the productive training to offset the additional
costs. The cost of such a training format would be relatively
stable throughout its period of employment and would consist
of the basic personnel cost of maintaining individuals in the
unit plus the transportation, messing and berthing costs at
the training sites. The overall cost would be reduced by any
active duty personnel savings that could be realized as a re-
sult of continuous employment of reserve personnel.
Upgrading the facilities at various training centers
serving telecommunications units is another possible alterna-
tive in establishing a training program. This would entail
establishing a minimum equipment suite to standardize the
facilities at each of the 89 centers. The cost of implement-
ing such a course of action would involve a minimum amount of
design cost since most equipment would be off the shelf. The
investment and installation, especially site preparation
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costs, would be considerable. The continued operation and
maintenance costs of the suite would be minimal. The problem
with implementing this particular course of action is that
the equipment suite that would of necessity be selected could
not adequately provide the requisite training to the tele-
communications units. The equipment suite, due to lack of
personnel and sheer economic constraints, would be limited to
a communications operation found in a smaller ship's radio
shack. The equipment and the functions that are required in
a NAVCOMMSTA environment could not be simulated in such a
suite. Therefore, although some communications-related train-
ing could be performed, its relative impact on unit readiness
to assume duties in mobilization billets at NAVCOMMSTA' s would
be minimal. One other factor which does not modify the effec-
tiveness of the suite as a training device but does effect
the overall suite's cost factor is that such a suite's over-
all cost could be shared by other programs which have a re-
sponsibility for training telecommunication rates.
Mobile vans configured to simulate portions of a NAVCOMM-
STA' s operation is another possible alternative. Under this
training format an equipment suite would be configured to
provide training in certain functions of a NAVCOMMSTA' s opera-
tion. The design and testing cost of such a suite would be
high. First, the function that would be simulated would have
to be broken out and analyzed. This would have to be fitted
to equipment capable of handling such a function. In most
cases, existing equipment would have to be redesigned to
accommodate such a small and restricted requirement.
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Additionally, equipment such as a micro-computer and associ-
ated software would be required to generate scenarios through
the system since it would most likely be off-line. The in-
vestment and installation cost would be high. The operation
and maintenance cost of the system would be moderate for each
van in operation. The effectiveness of the van concept as a
training format would be based primarily on how well the equip-
ment suite was designed to simulate the functions of a COMMSTA
and on the frequency that a unit had access to the van for
training purposes. Some of the problems associated with this
type format are in determining the number of vans required and
how they are to be operated and moved. If active duty person-
nel are to maintain them and provide the logistics for them,
then a new and more expensive cost is added to the system.
Overall the van would, if designed properly, provide some
training to improve mission capable time after mobilization,
but it would be a function of the success of the simulation
and the frequency of the unit's access to the van.
The ship operational trainers (SOT) to be placed at major
reserve centers is to contain a small communications suite;
if this suite was considerably upgraded to provide a major
message processing and switching function, it could serve
both as a training vehicle for the telecommunications unit
and as administrative tactical network between readiness
centers. To implement such a format would entail considerable
design and testing costs. It would be, in a sense, a mini-
communications network within the reserve community. It
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could be designed to emulate the operation of the naval
communications system; as such, each or some of the readiness
centers would interconnect with one another through leased
lines connected to switches and terminals at designated
readiness centers. The system could be used for inter-center
operations, exercises and administration. The operation of
the system would fall upon the reserve telecommunications
community. The investment and installation costs would be
very high. However, the continued maintenance and operation
of the system would be relatively low. Depending on the de-
sign of such a system the training value in respect to reduced
time until mission capable after mobilization could be high.
The design and initial investment cost of such a format al-
most preclude this from consideration unless it could be inte-
grated as a component requirement of most of the other re-
serve programs. In this manner the systems cost is appor-
tioned over a number of sponsors. Additional cost considera-
tion to be taken into account with this system are those
logistic costs associated with having units drill at the
readiness center vice their home centers.
In summary, the alternatives that have been discussed
and the relative cost of each is based on a qualitative
assessment of the funds required to design, construct and
activate each of the facilities. As the training is now
generally conducted, in the classroom, the cost is low; but
so also is the readiness of the individual or the unit to
step into a billet and perform at full efficiency. As the
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degree of readiness is increased, or the mission capable time
reduced, the cost generally rises. The rise in the cost ap-
pears to be a function of the amount of equipment required by-
each alternative and the relative complexity of designing a
system to simulate the functions performed in the operational
environment. This premise is true until the alternative of
WAT is considered. Here since the format of training does
not involve equipment procurement but only transportation
costs, which would be considerably less, the cost in relation
to degree of readiness would be a relatively low cost result-
ing in a high degree of readiness. Figure 7 graphically dis-
plays the relative cost versus the degree of readiness at-















































































VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Naval Reserve has long been hampered in its effec-
tiveness by mismanagement and the "they vs. we" attitude with
the Regular Force. Due to the decision to fall back to the
reserves as the primary augmenting force in time of crisis,
a restructuring of the Reserve Force was ordered. The re-
structuring followed sound management principles and for the
first time appeared to really approach the needs of the opera-
tional commanders. As a part of this restructuring, the
Telecommunications Program was established to support COMNAV-
TELCOMM.
Due to the very nature of the billets required under
this program, the reserve personnel assigned to fill those
billets must be proficient and competent in the latest
communications technology. Thus, there is a real need to
first ensure that the mobilization requirements are stated
correctly in both quantity and quality. Once done, the faci-
lities, opportunities and funds must be made available so
that the individual reservist as part of an integral unit
can attain a "mission capable" status.
As the Telecommunications Program exists for the require-
ments of COMNAVTELCOMM, he must take an active role in moni-
toring the operation of the program if he is to have access
to the quality of personnel he requires for mobilization. He
must not only monitor the reserve side but must also insure
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that his subordinates at the active duty commands are stating
their mobilization needs correctly both in quantity and quali-
ty.
As a first step in ensuring that the reserve program
will provide the units the training that he requires, an
analysis of what degree of readiness is required of the various
units should be undertaken. From this analysis the operation-
al commander and the reserve commander can determine at what
cost this degree of readiness will come. Planning can then
take place on a long range basis to fund and implement some
format of training that will meet the requirements. As a
continuing step, COMNAVTELCOMM should involve himself in the
inspection cycle of the reserve telecommunications unit, for
it is only through this function that he can adequately deter-
mine if the training being conducted is providing the degree
of readiness that he needs to accomplish his mission.
In a more urgent sense, training in the short run must
be improved. There is a very real danger in losing people
in the program unless meaningful training is provided. With
the massive restructuring that has recently taken place to-
gether with all the uncertainties about billets and the direc-
tion that programs would take, morale among troops is low.
This fact, along with the almost total lack of facilities,
can drive people out of the program and out of the reserve al-
together. If funds for equipment or weekend away training is
not available, then the amount of training should be reduced
to such a point where some productive and meaningful training
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could be done through the savings realized in the reduced
drill schedule.






PROGRAM 11—SPECIAL AND GENERAL SUPPORT PROGRAM
RESERVE UNIT ORGANIZATION MANNING
FUNCTIONAL TYPE NO UNIT UNIT TOTAL




MANDATORY ORU 10 NAVCOMSTA 2/16 20/160
QUOTA (DCS) 180
GROUP
BASE ORU 14 BCT 2/22 28/308
SUPPORT 336
GROUP





























RATING E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 TOTAL
RM 2 3 2 1 8
ET 2 2












































RATING E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 TOTAL
RM 3 3 2 1 9
ETN 3 3 2 1 9
YN 1 1



































CURRENT NAVAL ENLISTED CLASSIFICATIONS (NEC) REQUIRED DURING
MOBILIZATION TO SUPPORT NAVTELCOM
NEC DESCRIPTION
ET-1403 AN/FRT/8 3/8 4/85 Technician
ET-1404 TROPO-SCATTER Technician
ET-1405 AN/FRT-39, AN/URT-19, AN/URA-30 Technician
ET-1406 AN/FRR-60, CU 138Z/UR Technician
ET-1407 AN/FTA-15, AN/FGC-69 Technician
ET-1408 AN/FRC-84, AN/FCC-17 Technician
ET-1409 AN/FGC-73, AN/UGR-14 Repairman
ET-1411 Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment
MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN
ET-1412 Special Fixed Communication Maintenance
Technician
ET-1416 Shore Receivers Facility Maintenance Technician
ET-1432 KW-37T Technician
ET-1433 Steamvalve Technician
ET-1434 KG- 13 Technician
ET-1435 KW-37R, KW-7 Technician




ET-1449 NBST Equipment Technician
ET-1598 Electronic Standards Specialist
RM-2 304 Intermediate Radio Operator (CW)
RM-2 305 DCS Satellite Communication Terminal
OPERATOR, AN/MSC-46 &/OT AN/TCS-S4
RM-2313 Communications System Manager
RM-2314 Cryptographic Machines Repairman (AN/SGA-3)
RM-2318 Communication System Technical Operator
RM-2319 Communication System Technical Supervisor
RM-2342 Teletype Repairman
RM-2346 Low-Level Keying Teletype Repairman
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CURRENT LDMX/NAVCOMPARS RM BILLET REQUIREMENTS
BILLET TITLE RECOMMENDED RATE NEC





















UNIT DESIGNATION LOCATION MILES TO COMMSTA
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 101 MANCHESTER, NH 572 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 206 ADELPHI, MD 192 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 308 RIVIERA BEACH, FL 831 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 410 AUSTIN, TX 1319 SAN DIEGO
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 509 MONROE, LA 1058 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 612 CAPE GIRARDEAU, MO 1180 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 717 LINCOLN, NE 1325 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 814 INDIANAPOLIS, IN 706 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 918 CHEYENNE, WY 1154 SAN FRANCISCO
NAVCOMSTA (DCS) 1022 SPOKANE, WA 875 SAN FRANCISCO
BCT 102 FT. SCHUYLER, NY 350 NORFOLK
BCT 203 ALBANY, NY 475 NORFOLK
BCT 304 READING, PA 296 NORFOLK
BCT 406 ROANOKE, VA 243 NORFOLK
BCT 507 CHARLESTON, SC 403 NORFOLK
BCT 607 GREENVILLE, SC 407 NORFOLK
BCT 708 JACKSONVILLE, FL 640 NORFOLK
BCT 811 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 1342 NORFOLK
BCT 914 GRAND RAPIDS, MI 768 NORFOLK
BCT 1016 TWIN CITIES, MN 1228 NORFOLK
BCT 1120 SAN FRAN, CA (TI) 86 SAN FRANCISCO
BCT 1220 SACRAMENTO, CA 53 SAN FRANCISCO
BCT 1322 GREAT FALLS, MT 1118 SAN FRANCISCO
BCT 1422 EUGENE, OR 528 SAN FRANCISCO
NAVCOMSTA 116 CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 1200 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 216 WATERLOO, IA 1101 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 317 WICHITA, KS 1365 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1001 BOSTON, MA 546 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1101 PROVIDENCE, RI 511 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1202 FT. SCHUYLER, NY 350 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1303 ERIE, PA 507 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1403 ALBANY, NY 475 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1503 SYRACUSE, NY 515 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1604 FOLSOM, PA 265 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1704 HARRISBURG, PA 303 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1801 SPRINGFIELD, MA 469 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 1905 AKRON, OH 490 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2005 CLEVELAND, OH 519 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2105 PITTSBURGH, PA 395 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2205 DAYTON, OH 603 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2305 MC KEESPORT, PA 410 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2406 ALEXANDRIA, VA 187 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2523 KNOXVILLE, TN 500 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2607 GREENSBORO, NC 230 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2707 CHARLOTTE, NC 312 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2807 RALEIGH, NC 169 NORFOLK
NAVCOMSTA 2908 TAMPA, FL 831 NORFOLK
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